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Abstract 
While previous states of the EU-15 could decide if they would accept the common European currency or not, 
newly entering states are committed to accepting the EUR. The first country that accepted the EUR (apart from 
the EU-15, of which 12 countries have the common currency) was Slovenia (2007), and afterwards Cyprus and 
Malta (2008), and from 1.1.2009 the EU was joined by Slovakia. Countries have to fulfill defined criteria to enter 
the EU, so it can be assumed that there are indirect but doubtless interconnections: taxes → state budget revenues 
→ state budget balances → Maastricht criteria accomplishment (before the country enters the euro zone), or 
fulfilling the Stability and Growth Pact. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the possible influence of EUR 
implementation on tax systems in the selected countries. The author deals with the evaluation of EUR 
implementation consequences in the first 12 countries by means of a macro-economic characteristic analysis in 
the first part of the paper, and in the second part offers more detailed analyses of Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta.  
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1. Introduction 
The EU formation is a result of the long-term 
integration development of European Union member 
states. The EUR common currency implementation 
has a cardinal importance for European Community 
development and helps to fill four freedoms: free 
movement of goods, services, labour, capital and 
payments (Baele et al., 2004, or Cattoir, 2004).  
On 1.1.2002, the EUR was implemented into cash 
circulation in twelve1 European Union states. While 
																																																													
1 In Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland (IE), 
Italy (IT), Luxemburg (LU), Germany (DE), Netherlands 
previous states of the EU-15 could decide if they 
accepted the common European currency or not,2 
newly entering states3 do not have this option and they 
commit to give up (sooner or later) their national 
currency and to accept the common currency. The first 
state who extended into the EUR was Slovenia (from 
																																																																															
(NL), Portugal (PT), Austria (AT), Greece (EL) and Spain 
(ES). 
2 Denmark and Great Britain exploited the possibility of the 
common currency non acceptation, Sweden has a temporary 
exception.  
3 Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (from 
1.5.2004), Bulgaria and Romania (from 1.1.2007).  
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1.1.2007), from 1.1.2008 Cyprus and Malta approved 
the common currency and from 1.1.2009 Slovakia 
became the 16th member of the euro area. 
While in the European Community the monetary 
policy is set a clear aim, i.e. common currency 
implementation, such a common base is not set in the 
tax field (James and Nobes, 1999 or Salanie, 2003). 
These current barriers exist for particular types of 
taxes in the European Union (Steiner and Woods, 
2000): 
 personal income taxes stay in the competence 
of national governments,  
 indirect taxes immediately influence the 
functioning of the single market and stay at the 
centre of attention and effort of its 
harmonization,  
 corporation taxes should help to free 
movement of capital and should not cause 
harmful competition among individual 
countries,  
 social and pension systems should eliminate 
the discrimination of inhabitants of individual 
countries and should not be a barrier to free 
settlement and investment in every European 
Union member state. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the possible 
influence of EUR implementation on tax systems in 
the selected countries. We also try to answer the 
question if EUR implementation (or preparing for its 
implementation) as a result of the public policy and 
necessary filling of the fiscal discipline will have a 
relevant reflection in parameters to the changes of tax 
systems of individual countries. 
The following section contains methodological 
analysis. In the third part of the paper, the reached 
results are divided into the changes of tax quantities in 
Euro zone countries and the changes in selected states. 
The interaction of the tax and fiscal policy and 
possible impacts of euro implementation affecting tax 
field is also summarized there. 
2. Methodology and used methods 
Analyze of the impact of the euro implementation on 
tax systems was done on two levels: 
 analysis of the original 12 euro zone countries 
and its development by means of macro-
economic characteristics (in period 2000–
2005, thus not only the period before they 
entered the euro zone, but also analysis of the 
years following the euro zone entry),  
 comparison of Slovenia tax characteristics 
which introduces the country that entered the 
euro zone in 2007 and at the same time the 
first country with a transforming economy that 
accepted the euro (in period 2005–2008). 
The methodology can be described: 
   ,/;/;/;1 iGDPSIGDPDTGDPITTQ (1) 
where Δε1 is the change induced in the period of the 
euro implementation, ΔTQ is the change of the tax 
quote, ΔIT/GDP the change of the particular tax quote 
(indirect taxes to gross domestic product), ΔDT/GDP 
the change of the share of direct taxes to gross 
domestic product, ΔSI/GDP the share of social 
insurance to gross domestic product, i – the number of 
countries of the original euro area (i = 1, 2, …, 12),  
   ,;;;2 jVATCITPITPIT TBTR  (2) 
where Δε2 is the change induced in the period of the 
euro implementation, ΔPITTR the change of tax rates 
of the personal income tax, ΔPITTB the change of tax 
brackets of the personal income tax, ΔCIT the change 
of corporate tax rates, ΔVAT the change of the value 
added tax, j number of new euro zone countries (j1 = 
Slovenia, j2 = Cyprus, j3 = Malta). 
3. Results 
3.1 Tax quote development  
The comparison of individual taxes in selected 
countries does not have a high predicative ability 
(Široký and Maková, 2007, and Široký, 2006) for 
reasons of different tax construction (except for 
harmonized parameters of indirect taxes). The tax 
quote indicator enables this comparison. 
It is evident from Figures 1 to 4 (for figures and 
respective numerical values see appendix) that the 
implementation of EUR circulation from 1.1.2002 did 
not have a fundamental influence on the tax quote of 
these 12 countries, in the analyzed period between 
2000–2005. A change of the tax quote by more than 
3% was only seen in four countries (Finland, Ireland, 
Germany and Greece). The average (ΔεA1-12) change 
was 1.75 percentage points. Partial tax quotes also did 
not record any significant movement in the year of 
EUR acceptance, which is shown in Table 1. In the 
analyzed period, the lowest changes were in social 
insurance (0.56) according to the premises, on the 
contrary a bigger change in direct taxes (1.35) than in 
indirect taxes (0.79) is slightly surprising. Partial tax 
quotes also did not record any significant movement 
in the year of EUR acceptance, which is shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 The change of chosen macroeconomic tax indexes in percentage points (the difference between the highest and lowest 
divergence in period 2000–2005) 
 ΔεBE ΔεFI ΔεFR ΔεIE ΔεIT ΔεLU ΔεDE ΔεNL ΔεPT ΔεAT ΔεEL ΔεES ΔεA1-12
ΔTQ 0.6 3.3 1.3 3.2 1.2 1.2 3.1 2.7 1.4 2.7 3.5 2.1 1.75 
ΔIT/GDP 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.5 2.8 1.0 0.79 
ΔDT/GDP 0.6 3.6 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.9 2.3 1.0 1.4 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.35 
ΔSI/GDP 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 2.3 1.0 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.56 
Source: Own Calculation  
Table 2 Development of deductible items at personal income tax in Slovenia in period 2005–20084 
 2005 (SIT) 
2006 
(SIT) 
2007 
(EUR) 
2007 
(SIT conv.) 
2008 
(EUR) 
2008 
(SIT conv.) 
Basic deductible item 564,400 591,900 2,800 670,992 2,959.60 709,239 
Deductible item for taxpayers 
older than 65 years 275,300 281,081 1,205 288,766 1,273.69 305,227 
Deductible item for the first 
child 474,900 484,873 2,066 495,096 2,183.76 523,316 
Table 3 Personal income tax rates in Slovenia in 2005 
Annual taxable income (SIT) Tax from the lower sum (SIT) Rate from the exceeding sum (%) 
to 1,300,000 0 16 
1,300,000 – 2,540,000 208,000 33 
2,540,000 – 5,140,000 617,200 38 
5,140,000 – 10,330,000 1,579,200 42 
over 10,330,000 3,707,100 50 
Table 4: Personal income tax rates in Slovenia in 2006 
Annual taxable income (SIT) Tax from the lower sum (SIT) Rate from the exceeding sum (%) 
to 1,327,300 0 16 
1,327,300 – 2,593,340 212,368 33 
2,593,340 – 5,247,940 630,161 38 
5,247,940 – 10,546,930 1,612,363 42 
over 10,546,930 3,784,949 50 
Table 5 Personal income tax rates in Slovenia (2007) 
Annual taxable income (EUR) Tax from the lower sum (EUR) Rate from the exceeding sum (%) 
to 6,800 0 16 
6,800 – 13,600 1,088 27 
13,600 and more 2,924 41 
Annual taxable income (SIT conv.) Tax from the lower sum (SIT conv.) Rate from the exceeding sum (%) 
to 1,629,552 0 16 
1,629,552 – 3,259,104 260,728 27 
3,259,104 and more 700,707 41 
Table 6 Personal income tax rates in Slovenia (2008) 
Annual taxable income (EUR) Tax from the lower sum (EUR) Rate from the exceeding sum (%) 
to 7,187.60 0 16 
7,187.60 – 14,375.20 1,150.02 27 
over 14,375.20 3,090.67 41 
Annual taxable income (SIT conv.) Tax from the lower sum (SIT conv.) Rate from the exceeding sum (%) 
to 1,722,436 0 16 
1,722,436 – 3,444,873 275,591 27 
3,444,873 and more 740,648 41 
																																																													
4 Source: Kesti (2006, 2007), Cowley et al. (2008) and own calculations. 
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3.2 The development of the most important taxes 
in the “new” euro zone countries 
Slovenia 
The Slovene tax system consists of direct income 
taxes including wage tax paid by the employer, social 
security contributions, property tax and indirect taxes. 
These basic characteristics of the tax system were not 
changed by Slovenia’s EU entry. 
The general rate of corporate tax had the following 
values: 25% in 2005 which was gradually lowered by 
about one percentage point every year, in 2008 it was 
22%. A lowered tax rate, in the amount of 10%, will 
be used by companies conducting business in the 
special economic areas of Koper and Maribor. 
The EUR acceptance did not cause any 
discontinuous innovation in the system of corporation 
taxation, the gradual lowering of the tax burden 
probably ensues from the effort of adjusting the 
nominal rate to diminishing trends in other countries. 
Also tax incentives have been kept after EU entry. 
Individuals are taxed separately in the field of 
personal income tax with the exception of particular 
incomes from agriculture, where the common taxation 
of a household is possible. The tax base includes the 
total sum of all income categories lowered by 
accepted expenses, personal deductions and social 
security contributions. Then the tax is calculated with 
the aid of sliding progressive rates. 
Taxpayers can deduct deductible items from the 
tax base. Table 2 shows the development of these 
deductible items in the last three years. The 
conversion between Slovenian tolar (SIT) and the 
EUR was done by the official rates for conversion on 
the date of EU entry – 239.640 SIT for 1 EUR. 
In Tables 3 – 6 are summaries of tax brackets and 
tax rates in period 2005–2008.5  
The Slovenian entrance into the EU was not 
interconnected with the increase of the taxpayers’ tax 
burden, more to the contra ry the tax bracket 
boundaries were increasing and the highest tax rate 
was decreasing.  
The rates of value added tax have not been 
changed after the Slovenian entrance into the EU 
(20% and 8.5%), the tax exemption for small 
enterprises according to the overall turnover has been 
increased from 5 million SIT in 2006 to 25,000 EUR 
in 2007 (5,991,000 SIT conversion). 
It can be claimed that the Slovenian entrance into 
the EU, did not have any fundamental impact on the 
																																																													
5 Source: Kesti (2006, 2007), Cowley et al. (2008). 
Slovene tax system, both company tax rates and 
personal income tax have been increased, while on the 
contrary the limit for the compulsory registration of a 
subject as a value added tax payer has been increased. 
Cyprus 
The Cyprus tax system consists of corporate tax, 
personal progressive income tax and value added tax. 
Excise duties, defense contribution and social 
insurance payments are also important tax deliveries, 
on the contrary there are no property taxes levied in 
Cyprus. These basic characteristics of the tax system 
were not changed when Cyprus entered into the EU.  
Companies, other than statutory, have to pay 
corporate tax in the amount of 10% and this tax rate 
was not changed in the analyzed period 2005–2008. 
Tax rates and tax brackets in the analyzed period 
are shown in Table 7 and 8.6 
Table 7 Tax rates and tax brackets of the personal income 
tax (2005 – 2007) 
Taxable income 
(CYP) 
Tax rate 
(%) 
to 10,000 0 
10,001 – 15,000 20 
15,001 – 20,000 25 
over 20,000 30 
Table 8 Tax rates and tax brackets of the personal income 
tax (2008) 
Taxable income 
(EUR) 
Taxable income 
(CYP conversion) 
Tax rate 
(%) 
to 19,500 to 11,413 0 
19,500 – 28,000 11,414 – 16,388 20 
28,000 – 36,300 16,389 – 21,245 25 
over 36,300 over 21,245 30 
 
In Cyprus, the legislative form of value added tax 
was not changed in the analyzed period, the basic tax 
rate is 15%, the lowered tax rates are in the amount of 
8% and 5%. In 2008, the registration duty rises when 
turn-over exceeds 15,600 EUR, in 2005–2007 it was 
9,000 CYP (15,377 EUR). 
In Cyprus, EUR acceptance was related to a slight 
increase to the tax brackets of personal income tax, 
however the rates of corporate tax and value added tax 
were not changed (the registration limit was slightly 
increased in the VAT). The changes made were either 
positive or neutral for taxpayers. 
Malta  
The Maltese tax system has its origin in the former 
British system, which means that company profit is 
																																																													
6 Source: Kesti (2006, 2007), Cowley et al. (2008). 
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subject to income tax, but there is no individual or 
separate company tax. Important components of the 
Maltese tax system were harmonized with the tax law 
of the European Community during the access period. 
The rate of corporate tax is 35% and it did not 
change during the analyzed period 2005–2008. In 
Malta there are dual rates of personal income tax: 
partly for spouse splitting and partly for separate 
taxation. 
Changes in tax rates are shown in Tables 9–11.7 
In Malta, the legislative form of value added tax 
was not changed in the analyzed period, the basic tax 
rate is 18%, the lowered tax rate is in the amount of 
5%. 
In Malta, EUR acceptance was related to a slight 
increase of the tax brackets of personal income tax 
while the number of tax brackets was lowered (about 
two before entrance to the EU), rates of corporate tax 
and value added tax were not changed. The changes 
made were either positive or neutral for taxpayers. 
Changes in the period of the euro acceptance in 
Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta 
There were no dramatic changes in the characteristics 
of the main taxes in the three mentioned countries of 
the EU, as summarized in Table 12. The changes 
made were positive for taxpayers. The reason for the 
enlargement of tax brackets could be attributed to the 
anxiety of the price level increase caused by the EUR 
acceptance. 
3.3 Interaction of the tax and fiscal policy  
The analysis of the interaction is based on the premise 
that the European Union states revise public budget 
revenues with an aim to fill the fiscal criteria for the 
EU entry by virtue of taxes that represent a fiscal 
policy tool. 
The so called Maastricht criteria (Van den Berg 
and Lewer, 2007) approved in 1992 show the 
readiness of the member state for adopting the 
common currency and deal with: 
 price stability – the inflation rate should not 
exceed more than 1.5% of the inflation rate of 
the three states that achieved the best results in 
this field in the preceding year, 
 budget deficit – deficit has to be under 3% of 
the GDP level, 
 debt – the limit is set at 60% GDP, 
 long term money rates – rates should not 
exceed by more than two percentage points the 
																																																													
7 Source: Kesti (2006, 2007), Cowley et al. (2008). 
rates of the three member states that achieved 
the lowest inflation rate in the preceding year,  
 stability of exchange rates – the exchange rate 
should stay at a fixed term interval for two 
years. 
The Stability and Growth Pact obliges the EU 
states to respect the principle of a balanced or almost 
balanced budget, governments should have sufficient 
financial reserves to keep deficits under 3% of the 
GDP level. 
Thus fiscal rules of the EU impose the condition 
on tax systems that tax lowering has to be done with 
respect to the public sector size. Tax lowering has to 
be subordinated to reductions on the expenditure side 
of budgets on an annual basis due to the rules. 
3.4 Next possible impacts of the euro 
implementation that influence the tax field  
The principle of the intact citizen is valid in the course 
of EUR implementation, it means that the rounding off 
of sums in the course of EUR conversion is done to 
the benefit of the citizen. Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1103/97 on EUR implementation regulations from 17th 
June 1997 deals with the rounding off of sums issue 
during the transition to EUR currency (the Regulation 
assumes that a general law about EUR implementation 
will be agreed and it will contain concrete 
methodology for rounding). 
State fees and taxes will be rounded down on the 
basis of this law during the course of EUR conversion, 
contrary to the tax returns, where the amounts of tax 
revenues sent to the receivers according to the 
budgetary assignment of tax revenues and state 
payments to citizens will be rounded up. The citizen is 
not only an individual, but all subjects of the private 
sector according to the regulation (Schadler, 2005). 
This implies that it will generally be necessary to 
round the financial sums down in the field of public 
budgets revenues. Rounding will cause budget 
revenues (especially taxes and duty) to decrease in the 
year of EUR implementation in comparison with the 
last year of the national currency functioning as legal 
tender. Contrarily in the case of budget expenditures, 
it will be necessary to round up the financial sum 
converted into EUR in the interest of the intact citizen. 
Thus annual budget expenditure (salaries, social 
insurance benefits paid and the state social support) 
will increase in comparison with the year before EUR 
implementation. 
4. Conclusion 
The EUR implementation has no direct impact on the 
taxation area, not only from an economic point of 
view, but also from the view of empirical results. 
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Based on economic theory, there are no regularities 
presented which should cause changes in taxation on a 
macro and micro economical level in the course of 
currency exchange. From that point of view the tax 
policy is considered to be autonomous (which can be 
considered generally, not only in connection with EU 
implementation, but also for example in the case of 
Czechoslovakia splitting). 
The entrance of 12 member states into the EU 
(from the previous EU-15) was not connected with a 
tax rate increase but on the contrary with a slight fall. 
Although the currency integration dramatically 
increased the capital mobility and the tax competition 
in this field, it did not lead to the tax burden shifting, 
relevant changes in the tax quote or the partial tax 
quote or the tax burden of particular economic factors. 
The example of Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta 
confirms that. 
The tax competition among individual states in the 
EU is determined especially by national interests, 
there cannot be any relevant bigger impact determined 
on the entrance of countries into the EU or on tax 
competition in the EU. 
It is possible to suppose that the eventual EUR 
implementation in the next countries should not lead 
to an increase of the tax burden, because it did not 
happen in the states entering into the EU either. 
The impact of the EUR implementation can be 
implicitly shown in the tax policy by means of public 
finance, partly by the effort to fulfill the criteria for 
EU entry and partly by the effort to fill the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Table 9 Tax rates (2005 and 2006) 
Spouse splitting Separate taxation 
taxable income (MTL) rate (%) taxable income (MTL) rate (%) 
to 4,300 0 to 3,100 0 
4,301 – 6,000 15 3,101 – 4,100 15 
6,001 – 7,250 20 4,101 – 5,000 20 
7,251 – 8,500 25 5,001 – 6,000 25 
8,501 – 10,000 30 6,001 – 6,750 30 
over 10,000 35 over 6,750 35 
Table 10 Tax rates (2007) 
Spouse splitting Separate taxation 
taxable income (MTL) rate (%) taxable income (MTL) rate (%) 
to 4,500 0 to 3,250 0 
4,501 – 8,000 15 3,251 – 5,500 15 
8,001 – 10,000 25 5,501 – 6,750 25 
over 10,000 35 over 6,750 35 
Table 11 Tax rates (2008) 
Spouse splitting Separate taxation 
taxable income (MTL) rate (%) taxable income (MTL) rate (%) 
to 11,400 0 to 8,150 0 
11,401 – 20,500 15 8,151 – 14,000 15 
20,501 – 28,000 25 14,001 – 19,000 25 
over 28,001 35 over 19,001 35 
taxable income (MTL conversion) rate (%) taxable income (MTL conversion) rate (%) 
to 4,894 0 to 3,499 0 
4,895 – 8,801 15 3,500 – 6,010 15 
8,802 – 12,020 25 6,011 – 8,157 25 
over 12,021 35 over 8,158 35 
Table 12 Summary of changes in the most important taxes at new members of the euro area 
 ΔPITTR ΔPITTB ΔCIT ΔVAT Exchange rate 
ΔεSI ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 239,640 SIT/1 EUR 
ΔεCY ↓ ↓ 0 0 0.585274 CYP/1 EUR 
ΔεMT ↓ 0 0 0 0.429300 MTL/1 EUR 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Appendix 1 
Development of the tax quote and partial tax quotes in the first 12 countries of the euro area *)  
Figure 1 Tax quote development in selected countries in period 1995 – 2005 
 
Figure 2 Development of indirect taxes as % of GDP in selected countries in 2000 – 2005  
 
 
 
 
  
																																																													
*) Source: European Commission. Taxation Trends in the European Union. Luxembourg: EC, 2008. Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm +own calculations. 
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Figure 3 Development of direct taxes as % of GDP in selected countries in 2000 – 2005 
 
 
Figure 4 Development of social security contributions as % of GDP in selected countries in 2000 – 2005  
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Appendix 2  
Development of basic tax macro-economic indicators in first 12 countries of the euro area*)  
BELGIUM 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 45.2 45.2 45.3 44.9 45.0 45.5 
2002 = 100 99.78 99.78 100.00 99.12 99.34 100.44 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 13.8 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.6 13.9 
2002 = 100 103.76 100.00 100.00 100.75 102.26 104.51 
Direct taxes 17.5 17.7 17.6 17.2 17.5 17.8 
2002 = 100 99.43 100.57 100.00 97.73 99.43 101.14 
Social security contribution 13.9 14.2 14.4 14.3 14.0 13.9 
2002 = 100 96.53 98.61 100.00 99.31 97.22 96.53 
FINLAND 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 47.2 44.6 44.6 44.0 43.4 43.9 
2002 = 100 105.83 100.00 100.00 98.65 97.31 98.43 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 13.9 13.4 13.6 14.2 14.0 14.1 
2002 = 100 102.21 98.53 100.00 104.41 102.94 103.68 
Direct taxes 21.4 19.2 19.1 18.0 17.8 17.9 
2002 = 100 111.46 100.52 100.00 94.24 93.19 93.72 
Social security contribution 11.9 12.0 11.8 11.8 11.7 12.0 
2002 = 100 100.85 101.69 100.00 100.00 99.15 101.69 
FRANCE 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 44.1 43.8 43.1 42.8 43.1 44.0 
2002 = 100 102.32 101.62 100.00 99.30 100.00 102.09 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 15.8 15.4 15.4 15.3 15.5 15.8 
2002 = 100 102.60 100.00 100.00 99.35 100.65 102.60 
Direct taxes 12.5 12.6 11.8 11.4 11.6 11.9 
2002 = 100 105.93 106.06 100.00 96.61 98.31 100.85 
Social security contribution 16.1 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.2 16.4 
2002 = 100 99.38 99.38 100.00 100.62 100.62 101.23 
IRELAND 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 31.7 29.8 28.5 29.1 30.5 30.8 
2002 = 100 111.23 104.56 100.00 102.11 107.02 108.07 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 13.7 12.5 12.4 12.7 13.3 13.6 
2002 = 100 110.48 100.81 100.00 102.42 107.26 109.68 
Direct taxes 13.5 12.8 11.7 12.0 12.6 12.4 
2002 = 100 115.38 109.40 100.00 102.56 107.69 105.98 
Social security contribution 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 
2002 = 100 100.00 102.27 100.00 102.27 106.82 109.09 
																																																													
*) Source: European Commission. Taxation Trends in the European Union. Luxembourg: EC, 2008. Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm +own calculations. 
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ITALY 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 41.8 41.5 40.9 41.3 40.7 40.6 
2002 = 100 102.20 101.47 100.00 100.98 99.51 99.27 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 15.2 14.7 14.7 14.3 14.3 14.5 
2002 = 100 103.40 100.00 100.00 97.28 97.28 98.64 
Direct taxes 14.5 14.8 14.1 14.7 13.9 13.5 
2002 = 100 102.84 102.78 100.00 104.26 98.58 95.74 
Social security contribution 12.1 12.0 12.1 12.3 12.4 12.6 
2002 = 100 100.00 99,17 100.00 101.65 102.48 104.13 
LUXEMBURG 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 39.1 39.8 39.1 38.5 37.9 38.2 
2002 = 100 100.00 101.79 100.00 98.47 96.93 97.70 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 14.0 13.6 12.9 12.7 13.6 13.4 
2002 = 100 108.53 105.43 100.00 98.45 105.43 103.88 
Direct taxes 15.0 15.3 15.3 14.9 13.4 14.1 
2002 = 100 98.04 100.00 100.00 97.39 87.58 92.16 
Social security contribution 10.1 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.7 
2002 = 100 91.74 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.17 
GERMANY 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 41.9 40.0 39.5 39.7 38.8 38.8 
2002 = 100 106.08 101.27 100.00 100.51 98.23 98.23 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 12.5 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.1 12.1 
2002 = 100 103.31 100.83 100.00 100.83 100.00 100.00 
Direct taxes 12.5 11.0 10.7 10.6 10.2 10.3 
2002 = 100 116.82 102.80 100.00 99.07 95.33 96.26 
Social security contribution 16.9 16.7 16.7 16.9 16.6 16.3 
2002 = 100 101.20 100.00 100.00 101.20 99.40 97.60 
NETHERLANDS 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 39.9 38.3 37.7 37.4 37.7 38.2 
2002 = 100 105.84 101.59 100.00 99.20 100.00 101.33 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 12.5 12.9 12.7 12.7 12.9 13.1 
2002 = 100 98.43 101.57 100.00 100.00 101.57 103.15 
Direct taxes 12.0 11.7 11.8 11.0 10.8 11.9 
2002 = 100 101.69 99.15 100.00 93.22 91.53 100.85 
Social security contribution 15.4 13.7 13.3 13.8 14.0 13.1 
2002 = 100 115.79 103.01 100.00 103.76 105.26 98.50 
PORTUGAL 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 34.3 33.9 34.7 35.1 34.2 35.3 
2002 = 100 98.85 97.69 100.00 101.15 98.56 101.73 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 14.1 14.0 14.5 15.2 14.5 15.3 
2002 = 100 97.24 96.55 100.00 104.83 100.00 105.52 
Direct taxes 9.9 9.5 9.4 8.8 8.6 8.5 
2002 = 100 105.32 101.06 100.00 93.62 91.49 90.43 
Social security contribution 10.3 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.1 11.3 
2002 = 100 95.37 97.22 100.00 102.78 102.78 104.63 
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AUSTRIA 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 42.8 44.7 43.7 43.1 42.8 42.0 
2002 = 100 97.94 102.29 100.00 98.63 97.94 96.11 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 15.1 15.0 15.2 15.0 14.9 14.7 
2002 = 100 99.34 98.68 100.00 98.68 98.03 96.71 
Direct taxes 13.1 15.1 14.0 13.6 13.5 12.9 
2002 = 100 93.57 107.86 100.00 97.14 96.43 92.14 
Social security contribution 14.6 14.6 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 
2002 = 100 100.69 100.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
GREECE 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 37.9 36.6 36.7 35.5 34.3 34.4 
2002 = 100 103.27 99.73 100.00 96.73 93.46 93.73 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 15.5 15.2 14.5 13.7 13.1 12.9 
2002 = 100 106.90 104.83 100.00 94.48 90.34 88.97 
Direct taxes 10.9 9.7 9.6 8.9 8.9 9.5 
2002 = 100 113.54 101.04 100.00 92.71 92.71 98.96 
Social security contribution 11.5 11.7 12.6 13.0 12.3 12.1 
2002 = 100 91.27 92.86 100.00 103.17 97.62 96.03 
SPAIN 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax quote 33.9 33.5 33.9 33.9 34.5 35.6 
2002 = 100 100.00 98.82 100.00 100.00 101.77 105.01 
Partial taxes as % of GDP 
Indirect taxes 11.9 11.5 11.6 11.9 12.2 12.5 
2002 = 100 102.59 99.14 100.00 102.59 105.17 107.76 
Direct taxes 10.5 10.4 10.8 10.5 10.6 11.4 
2002 = 100 97.22 96.30 100.00 97.22 98.15 105.56 
Social security contribution 12.0 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.2 12.2 
2002 = 100 99.17 100.83 100.00 100.83 100.83 100.83 
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